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NOTHING NEW ON THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FRONT:
JANO WIAK v. CORPORATE CITY OF SOUTH BEND
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibits racial discrimi-
nation by the states.2 Ten years later, the United States Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act),3 which declares that no
person may discriminate against another person on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.4 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(Title VII), 5 an employer may not discriminate on the basis of race when
hiring or discharging employees. 6 However, despite the antidiscrimination
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment states that:
[No state shall] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Id.
2. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). In Brown the
Supreme Court considered whether public schools could racially segregate school children,
even though the schools provided allegedly separate but equal educational opportunities. Id.
at 493. The Brown Court examined whether segregated schools deprived black children of
the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. at 490-92. The Court in Brown found that the policy of racial
segregation has a detrimental effect on black children because the practice causes the
development of a sense of inferiority in black children. Id. at 494. Consequently, the Brown
Court found that separate educational institutions are inherently unequal. Id. at 495. The
Brown Court therefore held that racial segregation constituted a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
3. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d (1986), 2000a-2000e-2 (1989), 2000e-3-2000e-
5 (1986), 2000e-6-2000h-6 (1978)).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e-2 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights
Act) banned discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in a wide
variety of areas that affect individual activity. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000e-2
(1989) (prohibiting discrimination in several types of facilities and activities). Specifically,
the Civil Rights Act provided minority groups with federal protection from discrimination
in public accommodations and publicly owned or managed facilities, in programs receiving
federal funding, and in employment positions affecting interstate commerce. Id. at §§ 2000a,
2000b, 2000d, 2000e. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also prohibited employers from discrim-
ination in their employment practices. Id. at § 2000e-2; see generally Note, The Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 H~av. L. REv. 684, 684 (1965) (summarizing Civil Rights Act of 1964).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1989).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1989). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)
states that employers may not discriminate in any way against an employee or an applicant
for a position in the employer's company on the basis of the individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Title VII further provides that an employer may not
segregate or classify employees or applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin in any manner that adversely would affect the employee or applicant. Id. at
2000e-2(a)(2). Lastly, Title VII provides that courts should not construe Title VII to require
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:271
mandates of Title VII and the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court
has upheld racially-discriminatory affirmative action programs. 7 Under a
standard affirmative action employment program, an employer gives hiring
or promotional preferences to minority individuals to correct past discrim-
ination against minority groups. 8 The Supreme Court continuously has
refined the standards that govern affirmative action programs.9 As a result
any employer to grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on account of a
racial, religious, or gender-based imbalance between the percentage of minorities or women
in an employer's workforce and the percentage of similar persons in any community or
other area, or in the available area work force. Id. at 2000e-2(j).
7. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke the Supreme
Court considered the validity of a medical school admissions program that set aside 16 of
100 available spots in the school's incoming class specifically for minority applicants. Id. at
272-75. According to the Bakke Court, the school's desire to attain a diverse student body
was a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Id. at 311-12.
However, the Bakke Court found that the school's affirmative action program violated the
constitution for two reasons. Id. at 309, 316. First, the assignment of a fixed number of
places to minority individuals was an unnecessarily restrictive means of achieving the school's
goal. Id. at 316. Specifically, the school's use of a set-aside system failed to evaluate each
applicant as an individual. Id. at 319-20. At the same time, the Court approved of other
race-conscious admissions programs that considered a minority applicant's race as one factor
among many factors qualifying the applicant for admission. Id. at 316-18. The Bakke Court
stated that programs that consider an applicant's race as a positive factor do not insulate
the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. Id. at 317.
Second, the Bakke Court found that the school in Bakke was an incompetent body to make
findings of constitutional or statutory violations. Id. at 309. Consequently, the Bakke Court
held that the school's admission plan was unconstitutional. Id. at 320.
8. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a) (1988) (stating that Congress enacted Title VII to
encourage employers to voluntarily establish affirmative action programs in order to provide
equal employment opportunities for minorities and women). The Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) developed guidelines to clarify Title VII principles for
employers. Id. The EEOC guidelines also protect an employer from litigation if the em-
ployer's affirmative action program complies with Title VII principles. Id. at § 1608.1(c).
In the guidelines, the EEOC outlines the circumstances in which an employer appropriately
may adopt a voluntary affirmative action program. Id. at § 1608.3. First, an employer may
adopt an affirmative action program if the employer finds evidence that the employer's
employment practices adversely affect minority employees or applicants. Id. at § 1608.3(a).
Second, an employer may adopt an affirmative action program to correct the effects of the
employer's prior discriminatory practices. Id. at § 1608.3(b). Finally, an employer may
adopt an affirmative action program to increase the number of qualified minorities and
women in the employer's workforce if restriction by employers in general has limited the
number of qualified minorities and women artificially. Id. at § 1608.3(c).
In addition, the EEOC guidelines state that an employer's affirmative action program
is invalid unless the program contains three elements. Id. at § 1608.4. First, the employer
must undertake a reasonable self analysis to determine whether the employer's practices do,
or tend to, exclude, disadvantage, restrict, or impact adversely on minority employees or
women. Id. at § 1608.4(a). Second, based on the employer's finding in the self analysis
process, the employer should determine whether the employer has a reasonable basis for
concluding that an affirmative action program is appropriate. Id. at § 1608.4(b). Finally,
the employer must adopt an affirmative action program that relates reasonably to the
problems the employer's self analysis disclosed. Id. at § 1608.4(c).
9. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 453 (1986)
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of the Supreme Court's continuously changing standards, ambiguities have
arisen concerning whether an affirmative action program satisfies the
requirements of Title VII and the fourteenth amendment.10 In Janowiak
v. Corporate City of South Bend" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit addressed the validity of an employment-based affir-
mative action program that the City of South Bend, Indiana, had adopted.'
2
In June 1979 the Board of Public Safety (Board) of the City of South
Bend, Indiana (City) observed that while minority individuals constituted
14.1% of the City's population, minority individuals constituted only
5.3% of the City's fire department personnel. 3 In response to the dispro-
portionate employment statistics, the Board decided to increase the City's
recruitment of minority individuals for the City's police and fire depart-
ments. 4 To facilitate an increase in minority recruitment, the Board
appointed a special Minority Recruitment Task Force (Task Force) to
develop an affirmative action employment program. 5 The Task Force
studied the Board's hiring techniques and submitted a report to the Board
in January 1980.16 According to the Task Force report, the Board employed
reasonable hiring standards to recruit individuals for the City's police and
fire departments.' 7 The Task Force report stated that the Board should
retain the Board's existing hiring standards.' 8 The Task Force report
(holding that voluntary race-conscious plans need not benefit injured persons to satisfy Title
VII); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-92 (1980) (holding that congressional plan
requiring public contractors to use 10% of federal funds to procure goods or services from
minority-owned business enterprises did not violate fourteenth amendment because plan was
narrowly tailored to meet plan's objectives); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
209 (1979) (holding that private employer does not violate Title VII if employer voluntarily
implements affirmative action program to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job category); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-19
(1978) (stating that admissions programs that consider applicants' race as factor in admissions
decisions do not violate fourteenth amendment).
10. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities surrounding
courts' interpretations of Title VII).
11. 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754).
12. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1035 (7th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754) [hereinafter
Janowiak I1].
13. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 750 F.2d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1984), vacated,




17. Id. The district court in Janowiak I did not explain why the Task Force found
that the Board's hiring standards were reasonable. Id. However, the court noted the Task
Force's finding that, although minorities requested 28% of the applications for positions in
the fire department, minorities returned their applications at a rate of only 9%. Id. In
contrast, nonminorities returned their applications at a rate of 37%. Id. Based partially on
these statistics, the Task Force report concluded that the City's hiring standards were not
discriminatory. Id.
18. Id. The Janowiak I court noted that the Chairman of the Task Force did not find
that the Board's hiring procedures discriminated against minority applicants. Id.
1989]
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recommended, however, that in addition to retaining the Board's current
hiring standards, the Board should adopt an affirmative action hiring
program.19 In the opinion of the Task Force the percentage of minorities
on the police and fire departments should equal the percentage of minority
citizens in the City's population by 1985.20 In the spring of 1980 the City's
Minority Recruitment Review Committee (Committee) reviewed the Task
Force Report and recommended that the City adopt an affirmative action
program to increase the number of minority individuals on the City's
police and fire departments. 21 Under the Committee's proposed affirmative
action program, the Board would rank applicants for positions in the
police and fire departments on two different hiring lists.22 The first list
would rank minority applicants according to a minority applicant's score
on a standardized hiring test.23 The second list would rank nonminority
applicants according to a nonminority applicant's score on the same test.
24
Thereafter, a three-member panel would recommend the number of indi-
viduals from each of the two lists that the Board should hire.25 The Board
adopted the proposed affirmative action program in June 1980.26
In November 1980 the Board employed the newly created affirmative
action program to select five individuals for the City's fire department. 27
Upon completion of the hiring tests, one applicant, Timothy Janowiak,
ranked second on the Board's list of nonminority applicants. 21 Janowiak
also scored higher on the hiring tests than every one of the minority
applicants. 29 Although the Board decided to hire the highest ranking
19. Id. The Janowiak I court noted that the affirmative action program the Task
Force recommended consisted of a modified two-to-one preferential hiring plan. Id. The
goal of the affirmative action program was to bring the composition of the City's police
and fire department in line with the minority composition of the City within five years. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 559. According to the Janowiak I court, the Minority Recruitment Review
Committee (Committee) submitted a cumulative report to the Board after the Committee
had reviewed both the Task Force's report and the Board's employment hiring practices.
Id. at 558-59. The Committee Report, in concurrence with the conclusions of the Task Force
Report, stated that the minority representation on the police and fire department should
reflect the percentage of minorities in the City. Id. at 559.
22. Id. The circuit court in Janowiak I noted that all applicants had to achieve a




26. Id. at 558-59.
27. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 576 F. Supp. 1461, 1463 (N.D. Ind.
1983), rev'd, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984). The district court in Janowiak I found that,
pursuant to the City's affirmative action program, the City divided the applicants' names
into separate lists, depending on whether the applicant was a minority individual or a
nonminority individual. Id. The minority list contained the names of nine applicants. Id.




nonminority applicant, the Board did not hire Janowiak.3 0 Instead, the
Board hired the four highest ranking minority applicants to fill the
remaining four positions.3' Upon learning that the fire department had
rejected his application, Janowiak filed a discrimination suit against the
City in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana
2
Prior to the trial of Janowiak P3 in district court, the City moved for
summary judgment.3 4 The City argued that, as a matter of law, the City's
hiring decisions were not improper because the City based the City's hiring
decisions on a valid affirmative action program. 35 The district court
examined the City's affirmative action program in Janowiak I and con-
cluded that the City's program was constitutionally valid. 6 Accordingly,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The plaintiff in Janowiak I alleged that the Board's actions violated Title VII
by discriminating against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's race. Id. Janowiak had
filed a race discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Id. The EEOC issued Janowiak a right-to-sue letter in February 1982. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1986) (codifying procedure for filing race discrimination claim with Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)).
33. 576 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ind. 1983), rev'd, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
34. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 576 F. Supp. 1461, 1463 (N.D. Ind.
1983), rev'd, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
35. Id. at 1465-66. In Janowiak I the City based its motion for summary judgment to
the district court on an allegation that the Plaintiff failed to file an employment discrimi-
nation complaint with the EEOC within the requisite 180 days. Id. at 1463. According to
the City, the statute of limitations period began to run in October or November 1980 at
the time the City made the decision not to hire Plaintiff. Id. at 1463-64. Therefore, the
City claimed that because the 180 day period had passed, the federal district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1986) (stating
that employee must file charge alleging unlawful employment discrimination within 180 days
after alleged unlawful employment practice occurred). The plaintiff argued that the statute
of limitations period did not begin to run until February 1, 1981, when the City's agent
informed Plaintiff that the City would not hire Plaintiff. Janowiak I, 576 F. Supp. at 1465.
Consequently, the Janowiak I district court determined that a genuine issue of material fact
existed. Id. The district court therefore noted that summary judgment was inappropriate on
the statute of limitations issue. Id.
36. Id. at 1467-68. In deciding Janowiak I, the district court relied on a parallel Sixth
Circuit case. Id. at 1466 (citing Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 896-98 (6th Cir.)
(holding that severe statistical disparity between percentage of blacks in city's population
and percentage of blacks employed at each level of city's police department justified city's
affirmative action program), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040
(1984)). In light of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Bratton, the district court in Janowiak I
found that the City's affirmative action program served the City government's interest in
alleviating the adverse effects of discrimination because of the evidence the City presented
comparing the percentage of minority individuals the City fire department employed to the
percentage of minority individuals in the City's population. Janowiak I, 576 F. Supp. at
1467. Additionally, the district court found that the City had designed the affirmative action
program to accomplish the program's goals. Id.
Although the Plaintiff in Janowiak I alleged that the City's actions violated both Title
VII and the fourteenth amendment, the district court did not consider the validity of the
1989]
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the district court in Janowiak I granted the City's motion for summary
judgment.37 The plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
31
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak I considered the validity
of the City's affirmative action program under both Title VII and the
fourteenth amendment.3 9 The Seventh Circuit found that, under both Title
VII and the fourteenth amendment, the validity of the City's program
turned on whether the discrepancy between the number of minorities in
the City's population and the number of minorities in the City's police
and fire departments justified the City's use of a racially-discriminatory
affirmative action program. 40 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
disparity between the percentage of minorities on the City's police and
fire departments and the percentage of minorities in the City's population
was an inadequate finding of past discrimination to justify the City's
affirmative action program. 4' Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that
the City's affirmative action program violated both Title VII and the
fourteenth amendment. 42 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded Janowiak I to
the district court. 43 The City subsequently appealed the Seventh Circuit's
decision to the United States Supreme Court.44
The United States Supreme Court granted the City's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 45 However, the Supreme Court did not hear the City's
appeal in full." Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's
City's affirmative action program under Title VII. Id. at 1466-67. Instead,the district court
considered the constitutionality of the City's program under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
The district court reasoned that if the City's affirmative action program was valid under
the fourteenth amendment, the program also would satisfy the less stringent requirements
of Title VII. Id.
37. Id. at 1468.
38. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
39. Id. at 562-64.
40. Id. at 562, 563.
41. Id. at 562, 564.
42. Id. at 563, 564. The Seventh Circuit noted in Janowiak I that evidence of a
statistical disparity between the percentage of minorities the City employed and the percentage
of minorities in the City's population could demonstrate the existence of past discrimination
if additional evidence of past discrimination accompanied the evidence of a statistical
disparity. Id. at 564. However, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Task Force in Janowiak
I found that the City's employment practices did not discriminate against minority applicants.
Id. at 562-63. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit found that the statistical comparison the
City offered in support of the City's affirmative action program was insufficient evidence
to support the City's decision to adopt an affirmative action program. Id. at 564.
43. Id. In addition to reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the
Seventh Circuit in Janowiak I remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the plaintiff filed his reverse discrimination action within the statute of limitations period.
Id. at 561.
44. Corporate City of S. Bend v. Janowiak, 481 U.S. 1001 (1987).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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decision in Janowiak I and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for
further consideration.47 In remanding Janowiak I to the Seventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court instructed the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Janowiak




On remand, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak I149 reconsidered the
City's affirmative action program under Title VII and the fourteenth
amendment.5 0 The Seventh Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has
held that an affirmative action program violates Title VII unless the
program represents an employer's response to a manifest imbalance be-
tween the percentage of minority employees in a traditionally segregated
job category and the percentage of individuals in an area labor pool.5 1
Applying the Supreme Court's precedent to the City's affirmative action
program, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II found that the City did not
make a proper Title VII comparison.52 According to the Seventh Circuit,
the City based the City's affirmative action program on the City's general
population statistics rather than the percentage of qualified minorities in
the relevant area labor pool.53 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that
the City failed to present evidence that established a manifest imbalance
47. Id.
48. Id. In remanding Janowiak I to the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court ordered
the Seventh Circuit to reconsider Janowiak I in light of two earlier Supreme Court decisions.
Id. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the Seventh Circuit should reexamine
Janowiak I using Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) and Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Id. See also infra notes 66-73 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Johnson); infra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Wygant).
49. 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S.
Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754).
50. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1987), petition
for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754) [hereinafter Janowiak
Ill.
51. Janowiak II, 836 F.2d at 1037 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 631-32 (1987)). In Janowiak If the Seventh Circuit explained that an employer determines
the existence of a manifest imbalance by examining general statistical comparisons. Id. The
Seventh Circuit noted that courts, in analyzing jobs that require special expertise, must
compare the percentage of minorities in the employer's work force with the percentage of
minorities who possess the relevant qualifications in the area labor pool. Id. The Seventh
Circuit noted that courts, in analyzing jobs that do not require special expertise, must
compare the percentage of minorities in the employer's work force with the percentage of
minorities in the area's population. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the comparison for
jobs requiring special expertise should apply to the firefighting position at issue in Janowiak
II. Id. at 1039. However, the Seventh Circuit failed to explain the court's rationale for
deciding that the firefighter's position required special expertise. See id. (concluding that
firefighter's position required special expertise).
52. Id. at 1039-40.
53. Id. According to the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II, if a job category requires
that applicants possess minimum qualifications, the employer's proffered statistical compar-
ison must consider only individuals that are actually qualified for the specific job category.
Id. at 1040.
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between the percentage of minorities on the City's police and fire depart-
ments and the percentage of qualified minorities in the City labor pool.
4
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II held that, as a matter
of law, the City's affirmative action program violated Title VII. 5
The Seventh Circuit in Janowiak 11 also considered the constitutionality
of the City's affirmative action program under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.5 6 The Seventh Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court has held that an affirmative action program violates the
fourteenth amendment unless the program serves a compelling govern-
mental interest.? The Seventh Circuit determined that the only way an
employer can establish a compelling governmental interest is by presenting
evidence of prior discrimination by the employer." Based on the facts in
Janowiak 11 the Seventh Circuit found that the City failed to present
evidence that showed prior discrimination on the part of the City. 9
54. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated in Janowiak I1 that the City proffered no evidence
of past discrimination. Id. at 1039. According to the Seventh Circuit, the City should have
proffered evidence of a manifest imbalance between the composition of the police and fire
department's work force and the composition of the relevant qualified area labor pool. Id.
55. Id. In Janowiak 1 the Seventh Circuit did not analyze the City's affirmative action
program under the second prong of the Supreme Court's Title VII test because the Seventh
Circuit found that the program violated the first prong of the Supreme Court's Title VII
test. See id. (invalidating South Bend's program because program failed second prong of
Title VII test without examining program using first prong of Title VII test).
56. Id. at 1040. The Seventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the affirmative
action program in Janowiak II for two reasons. Id. First, the Supreme Court explicitly
instructed the Seventh Circuit court to reconsider the affirmative action program in Janowiak
11 in light of the Court's decisions in Johnson and Wygant. Corporate City of S. Bend v.
Janowiak, 481 U.S. 1001 (1987). Because the Wygant decision dealt with the fourteenth
amendment standards governing the implementation of affirmative action programs, the
Seventh Circuit had to examine the constitutionality of the City's affirmative action program
in Janowiak 11. Janowiak 11, 836 F.2d at 1040. Second, a decision on the merits of a
fourteenth amendment challenge to an affirmative action program would support the court's
decision on the Title VII challenge. Id.
57. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)). The Seventh
Circuit in Janowiak II noted that the Supreme Court's two-part fourteenth amendment test
requires the employer to show not only that the affirmative action program serves a
compelling governmental interest, but also that the employer has narrowly tailored the
program to achieve the program's objectives. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 285 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
58. Janowiak 11, 836 F.2d at 1040. The Seventh Circuit further noted in Janowiak 11
that evidence of an employer's prior discrimination can consist of a comparison between
the percentage of minority employees in the employer's work force and the percentage of
qualified minority individuals in the relevant area labor pool. Id.
59. Id. at 1041-42. In Janowiak 11 the Seventh Circuit stated that the City should
have presented evidence of a comparison between the percentage of minority individuals the
City employed and the percentage of qualified minority individuals in the relevant area labor
pool. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that the City improperly had predicated the City's
affirmative action program on a comparison between the percentage of minority individuals
the City employed and the percentage of minority individuals in the City's general population.
Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the City had not presented sufficient evidence
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Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the City's affirmative
action program violated the fourteenth amendment. 60 Thereafter, having
found that the City's program violated the fourteenth amendment and
Title VII, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the City in Janowiak L
6'
Unlike the procedural posture of most appellate court decisions, the
Seventh Circuit decided Janowiak II on remand from the United States
Supreme Court.62 The Supreme Court had ordered the Seventh Circuit to
reconsider Janowiak I in light of the Court's previous rulings in Johnson
v. Transportation Agenc) 3 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education."
In deciding to reverse the district court in Janowiak I, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Janowiak II accords with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Johnson and Wygant.
61
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency the County of Santa Clara,
California (County), wanted to align the percentage of women in the
County's work force with the percentage of women in the County's labor
pool.6 6 To facilitate an increase in the number of women in the County's
work force, the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency (Agency)
designed an affirmative action program. 67 Under the Agency's program,
the Agency considered the gender of a qualified applicant when making
promotional decisions within job fields in which the percentage of women
was inordinately low.68 The Johnson Court evaluated the validity of the
to prove that the City had engaged in any prior discrimination. Id. Consequently, the
Seventh Circuit found that the City had not justified the affirmative action plan by a
compelling governmental interest. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1042.
62. Id. at 1036; see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme
Court's order to Seventh Circuit to reconsider Janowiak 1).
63. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
64. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
65. Janowiak V. Corporate City of S. Bend, 835 F.2d 1034, 1036-42 (7th Cir. 1987).
See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing accord between Seventh Circuit's
decision in Janowiak II and Supreme Court's holding in Johnson); infra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text (discussing accord between Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak II and
Supreme Court's holding in Wygant).
66. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 621 (1987). In Johnson the
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency (Agency) observed that the percentage of women
in the Agency's entire work force and in five of seven job categories within the Agency was
far less than the percentage of women in the county labor pool. Id. In the Skilled Craft
Worker job category, the relevant job category in Johnson, women held none of the 238
Skilled Craft Worker positions. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Supreme Court in Johnson noted that the Agency's long-term goal in
adopting the affirmative action program in Johnson was to achieve a work force whose
composition mirrored the composition of the area labor pool. Id. at 621-22. However, the
Johnson Court found that the Agency's program did not set aside a certain number of
positions for minorities or women. Id. at 622. Instead, the Johnson Court found that the
Agency's program in Johnson authorized decision-making personnel to consider ethnicity or
1989]
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Agency's affirmative action program under Title VII.69 The Johnson Court
found that under Title VII the validity of an affirmative action program
requires two determinations. 70 First, the Johnson Court stated that, for
an employer to justify an affirmative action program, the employer must
show a manifest imbalance between the composition of the employer's
work force and the composition of the relevant area labor pool.71 Second,
the Court stated that an affirmative action program may not trammel
unnecessarily the rights of nonminorities or create an absolute bar to the
advancement of nonminorities.7 2 Applying the two-part test to the Agency's
program in Johnson, the Supreme Court found that the Agency's program
satisfied the standards of Title VII.7
3
gender as a factor when evaluating qualified candidates for a position in a traditionally
segregated job category. Id.
69. Id. at 620 n.2. In Johnson the Supreme Court considered a promotional decision
the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County made. Id. at 620-21. In December 1979
the Agency announced a vacancy for the road dispatcher position. Id. at 623. The plaintiff,
Paul Johnson, and Diane Joyce were among two of the nine applicants who qualified for
the promotion. Id. The Agency, pursuant to the affirmative action program, passed over
the plaintiff and promoted Ms. Joyce. Id. at 619. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit in
federal district court alleging that the Agency made the promotional decision on the basis
of sex, in violation of Title VII. Id. at 625. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Johnson
considered the validity of the Agency's affirmative action program only under Title VII.
Id. at 620 n.2. The Johnson Court noted, however, that if a complainant properly challenges
the constitutionality of an affirmative action program, the employer must justify the
employer's decision to adopt the affirmative action program under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id.
70. Id. at 631, 637-38. The Johnson Court relied on the Court's previous decision in
United Steelworkers v. Weber for the Court's Title VII analysis in Johnson. Id.; see United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding that purpose behind affirmative
action program must mirror purposes underlying Title VII, and affirmative action program
must not trammel unnecessarily interests of white employees).
71. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. The Supreme Court in Johnson noted that the proper
comparison for establishing the existence of a manifest imbalance depends on whether the
job classification requires applicants with special expertise. Id. at 631-32; see supra note 51
(describing appropriate use of different statistical comparisons when jobs require special
expertise and skill).
72. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.
73. Id. at 642. The Supreme Court found that the Agency's affirmative action program
in Johnson satisfied the first prong of the Title VII test because the Agency designed the
program to eliminate obvious imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. Id. at
637. The Supreme Court found that the Agency's affirmative action program satisfied the
second prong of the Title VII test for three reasons. Id. at 637-39. First, the Johnson Court
emphasized that the Agency's program did not set aside a specific number of positions for
women. Id. at 638. Instead, the Johnson Court noted that an applicant's gender constituted
one of a number of factors the Agency considered in deciding between qualified applicants.
Id. Second, the Johnson Court found that the plaintiff had no absolute entitlement to
receive the promotion. Id. Finally, the Court found that the Agency had designed the
Agency's program as a temporary measure. Id. at 639. The Johnson Court therefore found
that the Agency's program did not trammel unnecessarily the rights of nonminority em-
ployees. Id. at 640.
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The Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak II accords with the two-
part Title VII test that the Supreme Court articulated in Johnson.74 In
Janowiak II the City incorrectly based the City's affirmative action pro-
gram on a comparison between the percentage of minorities in the City's
work force and the percentage of minorities in the City's population.75
The City should have based the City's affirmative action program on the
comparison appropriate for a job requiring special expertise. 76 Moreover,
the City should have based the City's affirmative action program. on a
manifest imbalance between the composition of the fire department's work
force and the composition of the relevant City labor pool.77 Because the
City based the program on an improper statistical comparison, the City's
affirmative action program violated Title VII.78 Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit was correct in holding that the City's program violated the Title
VII test that the Supreme Court enunciated in Johnson.
7 9
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak II also accords with the
Supreme Court's decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.0 In
Wygant the Board of Education for the city of Jackson, Michigan (School
Board), and the city's teachers union bargained collectively for an affir-
mative action program that granted preferential protection against layoffs
to minority employees."' The Wygant Court found that the constitutionality
74. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (explaining that Seventh Circuit
properly found that South Bend based its affirmative action program on incorrect statistical
comparison).
75. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754).
76. Id. at 1040; see also Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
that firefighter's position requires special expertise).
77. Compare Janowiak II, 836 F.2d at 103.9 (stating that, in absence of evidence of
past discrimination, City must base affirmative action program on manifest imbalance
between composition of relevant qualified area labor pool and composition of employer's
work force in order to satisfy Title VII) with Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-32 (stating that, in
absence of evidence of past discrimination, governmental agency must base affirmative
action program on manifest imbalance between composition of relevant qualified area labor
pool and composition of employer's work force in order to satisfy Title VII).
78. Janowiak II, 836 F.2d at 1039-40. The Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II did not
apply the second prong of the Supreme Court's Title VII test to the City's program because
the City's affirmative action program failed to satisfy the first prong of the Title VII test.
Id.
79. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (explaining that Seventh Circuit's
Janowiak II decision properly interpreted Supreme Court's Title VII analysis that the
Supreme Court enunciated in Johnson).
80. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (explaining that Seventh Circuit's
Janowiak I1 decision properly interpreted Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in Wy-
gant).
81. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269-70 (1986). In 1972 the Jackson
Board of Education and the teachers' union agreed to add a layoff provision to their
collective bargaining agreement in response to racial tension in the Jackson community. Id.
at 270. The collectively-bargained affirmative action program in Wygant provided that, in
the event of layoffs, the percentage of minorities the school employed would remain at the
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of the school board's affirmative action program under the fourteenth
amendment turned on a two-part test . 2 First, the Wygant Court stated
that under the fourteenth amendment, the School Board must prove that
a compelling governmental interest existed to justify the School Board's
use of racial classifications.83 Second, the Wygant Court stated that the
fourteenth amendment required the School Board to tailor narrowly the
program to meet the program's goals.14 The Wygant Court found that the
School Board's affirmative action program placed an impermissibly heavy
burden on innocent nonminority employees by seriously disrupting the
lives of nonminority employees through the layoffs.8 5 Consequently, the
Wygant Court held that the School Board's affirmative action program
same level as the percentage of minorities the school employed at the time the layoffs began.
Id. at 270-71. However, when layoffs became necessary in 1974, the Board laid off
probationary minority teachers before the Board laid off any tenured nonminority teachers,
thereby violating the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 271. Consequently, the teachers'
union and two laid-off minority teachers filed suit against the Jackson Board of Education
in the federal district court. Id. In the Board's answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, the
Board denied that the Board had engaged in any prior employment discrimination. Id.
Although the federal district court and a subsequent state court concluded that the plaintiffs
had presented insufficient evidence to support a claim that the Board had engaged in
discriminatory hiring practices in the past, the state court held that the layoff provision was
a permissible means of remedying the effects of societal discrimination. Id. at 271-72.
Accordingly, the state court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 272. Consequently,
during the 1976-77 and 1981-82 school years, the Board adhered to the terms of the collective
bargaining provision by laying off nonminority teachers while retaining minority teachers
with less seniority. Id.
82. Id. at 274.
83. Id. at 274-78. The Wygant Court noted that an employer's desire to remedy the
effects of societal discrimination is an insufficient justification for an affirmative action
program. Id. at 274, 276. According to the Wygant Court, an employer must make
particularized findings that show prior discrimination on the employer's part. Id. at 276.
The Wygant Court did not consider whether a compelling governmental interest existed to
justify the School Board's use of racial classifications. Id. at 278. Instead, the Wygant
Court skipped to a consideration of the second prong of the fourteenth amendment test.
Id. at 279.
84. Id. at 283. The Wygant Court stated that the narrowly tailored requirement for
an affirmative action program necessitates a consideration of whether the employer could
have chosen another lawful and less restrictive alternative to accomplish the same goal as
the affirmative action program that the employer chose. Id. at 280 n.6.
85. Id. at 282-83. The Wygant Court noted that race-preferential union seniority plans
affected many employees who heavily were dependent on wages to meet their day-to-day
living expenses. Id. at 283. In addition, the Wygant Court noted that an employee may
have invested many years in one job with the expectation of earning stability and security.
Id. The Wygant Court stated that layoffs disrupt these expectations of stability. Id.
Consequently, according to the Court in Wygant, even a temporary layoff may have adverse
financial and psychological effects on those workers the company laid off. Id. The Wygant
Court noted that the Board could have adopted a less intrusive alternative to the race-
conscious layoff provision the Board had adopted, such as an affirmative action hiring
program. Id. at 283-84. According to the Wygant Court, affirmative action hiring programs
are less intrusive because hiring programs often foreclose only one of several opportunities
available to job applicants. Id.
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failed the two-part test and violated the fourteenth amendment.8 6
The Seventh Circuit's in Janowiak II correctly applied the two-part
fourteenth amendment test that the Supreme Court articulated in Wygant.
87
In Janowiak II the City based the City's affirmative action program on a
comparison between the percentage of minorities in the City's work force
and the percentage of minorities in the City's population. 8 Under the
Wygant test, however, the City had to justify the City's affirmative action
program by showing the existence of a compelling governmental interest.8 9
Accordingly, the City had to present evidence of a statistical disparity
between the percentage of minorities in the City's work force and the
percentage of minorities in the relevant City labor pool.90 Because the City
based the City's program on an improper statistical comparison, the City's
affirmative action program violated the fourteenth amendment. 9 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit was correct in holding that the City's affirmative
action program violated the Wygant Court's fourteenth amendment test. 92
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak II is fundamen-
tally correct, the Seventh Circuit failed to clarify two ambiguities that
courts encounter when evaluating affirmative action programs under Title
VII. 91 First, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II failed to clarify the proper
geographical scope of an area labor pool in a Title VII challenge to an
affirmative action program. 94 The Seventh Circuit stated in Janowiak II
that an employer's affirmative action program is invalid under Title VII
86. Id. at 284.
87. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (explaining that Seventh Circuit's
Janowiak II decision properly interpreted Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in Wy-
gant).
88. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754).
89. Id. at 1041-42.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II did not apply the second prong of the
fourteenth amendment test to the City's program because the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the City's program failed to satisfy the first prong of the test. Id.
92. Compare Janowiak II, 836 F.2d at 1041 (stating that employer must base affir-
mative action program on comparison between percentage of minorities in employer's work
force with percentage of qualified minorities in relevant area labor pool to justify affirmative
action program under fourteenth amendment) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75 (same). In
addition to properly interpreting the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson and Wygant,
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Janowiak II accords with the Supreme Court's most recent
decision on affirmative action programs. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 57
U.S.L.W. 4132, 4141-43 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1989) (holding unconstitutional Richmond program
requiring city contractors to subcontract at least 30% of total dollar amount of contract to
minority-owned businesses because city used improper statistical comparison to demonstrate
compelling governmental interest and because city did not narrowly tailor program to remedy
effects of prior discrimination).
93. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text (describing ambiguities that pervade
federal law on affirmative action programs).
94. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining significance of Seventh
Circuit's failure to discuss meaning of area labor pool).
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unless the program is an employer's response to a manifest imbalance
between the percentage of minorities in the employer's work force and
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant area labor pool.95 A
problem arises when the members of an employer's work force commute
to work from outside of a city's limits. 96 At least one circuit court has
held that when the members of an employer's work force commute to
work from outside of the city in which the employer conducts the em-
ployer's business, the employer should include within the area labor pool
individuals that live within the metropolitan area that surrounds the city
in addition to individuals that live within the city limits. 97 The Seventh
Circuit in Janowiak II never explained the geographical scope that courts
in the Seventh Circuit should impute to an area labor pool.9 Consequently,
the meaning of area labor pool under Title VII remains ambiguous in the
Seventh Circuit. 99
Second, the Seventh Circuit in Janowiak II failed to clarify the manner
in which courts should distinguish between jobs requiring special expertise
and jobs requiring no special expertise. 100 The Supreme Court has held
that, if an affirmative action program applies to jobs requiring special
skills or expertise, the employer must justify the affirmative action program
through a comparison of the percentage of minorities in the employer's
work force and the percentage of minority individuals in the area labor
pool who possess the relevant job qualifications. 10 1 At the same time the
Supreme Court has held that, if an affirmative action plan applies to jobs
that do not require special skills or expertise, the employer only has to
justify the program by means of a comparison between the percentage of
minorities in the employer's work force and the percentage of minority
individuals in the general population. 0 2 As a result of the Supreme Court's
holdings, if an employer's employees perform jobs that require special
expertise, the employer need not integrate as many minority individuals
into the employer's work force as the employer would need to integrate
95. Janowiak II, 836 F.2d at 1037.
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing problems that arise when
employees commute to work from outside of affirmative action program's geographical
limits).
97. See Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding, under
Johnson, that where approximately half of District of Columbia's entry level firefighters
lived in suburbs, District of Columbia should have predicated city fire department's affir-
mative action program on comparison between percentage of minorities city fire department
employed and percentage of minorities in relevant labor pool of entire metropolitan area).
98. See Janowiak 11, 836 F.2d at 1037-40 (discussing Seventh Circuit's failure to define
geographical scope of area labor pool).
99. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (revealing Seventh Circuit's failure
to discuss ambiguity in Supreme Court's area labor pool requirement).
100. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text (explaining significance of Seventh
Circuit's failure to define characteristics of jobs which require special expertise).
101. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1987).
102. Id.
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if the employees performed jobs that do not require special expertise. 103
Thus, a manipulative employer can discriminate indirectly against minority
individuals by classifying the employer's work force as employees who
perform jobs requiring special expertise.104 The Seventh Circuit's failure
to distinguish between jobs requiring special expertise and jobs that do
not require special expertise renders another area of Title VII ambiguous
and uncertain. 0
103. Id. at 632.
104. Id. The Supreme Court's rulings in cases challenging the disparate impact of
employer hiring or promotional standards may lessen the risk that unscrupulous employers
will use a special expertise classification to justify the employer's failure to attain an
integrated work force. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988)
(holding that courts may use disparate impact approach to analyze discretionary employment
practices that employee has challenged as violating Title VII). In Watson the Supreme Court
detailed the elements a minority plaintiff must prove to establish that an employer's facially
neutral hiring or promotional practice has an adverse impact on minority individuals. Id.
at 2790. Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the specific practice
has a disparate impact on minorities. Id. The defendant employer must then produce
evidence showing that the employer's employment practices are based on legitimate business
reasons. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must show that alternative tests or selection procedures
would serve the employer's interest in hiring efficient and trustworthy employees without a
similarly undesirable racial effect. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden
of proof on minority applicants who allege that an employer's hiring or promotional practices
have a disparate impact on minorities, thereby diminishing the chance that an employer will
have to defend his practice. See id. (describing elements plaintiff must prove to establish
that employer's employment practices have disparate impact on minorities); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that facially neutral requirements that have disparate
effect on minority applicants violate Title VII unless requirements are reasonable measure
of job performance).
105. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (revealing Seventh Circuit's failure
to clarify distinction between jobs requiring special expertise and jobs that do not require
special expertise). Apart from the Seventh Circuit's failure to resolve the ambiguities
surrounding the tests in Johnson and Wygant, the Seventh Circuit failed to consider whether
the Board's use of two lists to rank minority and nonminority job applicants in Janowiak
11 constituted the use of a quota, in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978)
(holding that school's admissions set-aside program in favor of minority applicants violates
fourteenth amendment); supra note 7 (analyzing facts in Bakke decision). The Bakke Court
held that quota programs were unconstitutional. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. The Bakke Court
held that an affirmative action program that admitted minority individuals to the medical
school simply because the individuals were members of a minority failed to consider each
applicant as an individual. Id. at 318. Therefore, the Bakke court held that the affirmative
action program violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. At the same time, the Bakke Court
approved of other race-conscious school admissions programs that considered a minority
applicant's race as one factor among many qualifying the applicant for admission. Id. at
316-18. The City's affirmative action program in Janowiak I and II disregards the Bakke
criteria because the program fails to consider each applicant as an individual. Compare
Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
three-member panel set number of minority applicants and nonminority applicants that
Board hired to fire department) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18 (explaining that programs
that set aside certain number of positions for minorities insulate individuals from comparison
with other applicants for available spots); accord Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480
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In Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend the Seventh Circuit
addressed the validity of an affirmative action employment program that
the City of South Bend, Indiana, had adopted.? 6 The Seventh Circuit
found that the City's program violated Title VII because the City failed
to present evidence of a manifest imbalance between the percentage of
minorities in the police and fire departments' work forces and the per-
centage of minorities in the relevant area labor pool.10 7 The Seventh Circuit
also found that the City's program violated the fourteenth amendment of
the constitution because the City failed to present evidence of prior
discrimination on the part of the City. 0 8 The Seventh Circuit therefore
invalidated the City's program in Janowiak 11. 109 The Seventh Circuit's
decision in Janowiak 11 accords with the Supreme Court precedent." 0
However, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak 11 fails to clarify
significant ambiguities that courts constantly face when evaluating affir-
mative action programs under Title VII.'" First, the Seventh Circuit in
Janowiak 11 failed adequately to define area labor pool in the context of
Title VII's manifest imbalance test." 2 Second, within the context of Title
VII, the Seventh Circuit failed to explain the distinctions between jobs
that require special expertise and jobs that require no special expertise."'
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit correctly decided Janowiak II, substantial
Title VII ambiguities remain in the Seventh Circuit. 1 4
Kym OLTROGGE
U.S. 616, 636-37 (1987) (approving affirmative action program that used applicant's gender
as one factor in making promotional decisions).
106. Janowiak v. Corporate City of S. Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1035 (7th Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1988) (No. 87-1754); see supra
notes 15-26 and accompanying text (describing procedure South Bend used prior to adopting
affirmative action program).
107. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (explaining Seventh Circuit's analysis
of South Bend's program under Title VII).
108. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (explaining Seventh Circuit's analysis
of South Bend's program using Supreme Court's fourteenth amendment test).
109. See supra notes 55, 60 and accompanying text (stating that South Bend's affirmative
action program violated both Title VII and fourteenth amendment).
110. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (revealing that Seventh Circuit's
decision in Janowiak II accords with Supreme Court's holding in Johnson); supra notes 87-
92 and accompanying text (revealing that Seventh Circuit's decision in Janowiak II accords
with Supreme Court's holding in Wygant).
I 11. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text (revealing Seventh Circuit's failure
in Janowiak I1 to discuss ambiguities surrounding evaluation of affirmative action programs
under Title VII).
112. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (revealing Seventh Circuit's failure
to discuss geographic ambiguity emanating from "area labor pool").
113. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (revealing Seventh Circuit's failure
to discuss ambiguity surrounding definition of jobs requiring special expertise).
114. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text (summarizing strengths and weak-
nesses of Seventh Circuit's holding in Janowiak 11).
